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Abstract
We study employment reallocation across employers through the lens of a dynamic
job-ladder model. Workers always agree on a ranking of employers at all points in time,
and search for better jobs both off and on the job. Because higher-ranked employers
attract and retain more workers, an employer’s size is a relevant proxy for its rank.
We exploit newly available U.S. data from JOLTS on employment flows by size of the
establishment. A parsimonious job ladder model fits the facts quite well, and implies
‘true’ vacancy postings by size that are more in line with gross flows and intuition
than JOLTS’ actual measures of job openings, previously criticized by other authors.
Focusing on the U.S. experience in and around the Great Recession, our evidence
indicates that the job ladder stopped working in the GR and has not yet fully resumed.
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1 Introduction
The persistence of high unemployment in the US and in many other countries after the
2007-2009 Great Recession (henceforth GR) is currently the central issue for macroeconomic
policy around the world. In previous work (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay 2009, 2012, 2013,
resp. MPV09, MPV12 and MPV13) we document empirically and formulate a hypothesis to
explain the pattern of employment decline and recovery during and after a typical recession.
In a nutshell, in a tight labor market high-paying, large employers overcome the scarcity of
unemployed job applicants by poaching employees from smaller, less productive and lower-
paying competitors, whose employment share then shrinks in relative terms. When the
expansion ends, large employers, that were less constrained, have more employment to shed
than small ones. In addition, the resulting high unemployment relaxes hiring constraints
on all employers, particularly the small ones that are less capable of poaching from other
firms. As a result, small employers downsize less in the recession and grow faster (still in
relative terms) in the early recovery. According to this hypothesis, in a prolonged phase of
high unemployment, as we witnessed since 2009, small firms should be leading the charge in
job creation, followed years later by upgrading to larger, better-paying employers.
We call this hypothesis a “dynamic job ladder”. The idea of a stationary job ladder,
a uniform ranking of jobs by all workers, who climb it slowly via job-to-job quits while
occasionally falling off it, is well established in the literature. Our previous work introduced
a business cycle dimension to this hypothesis on worker turnover. In this paper, we confront
this hypothesis with more demanding empirical tests. We still adopt employer size as an
empirical measure of the job ladder ‘rung’, based on the simple fact that employers higher up
in a ladder tend to be larger, as they attract and retain more employment, and also based
on the observed wage/size relationship. We go beyond the net worker flows by size that
we studied in our previous work, and here consider also the model’s implications for gross
worker flows (hires, quits, layoffs) and vacancy postings by employer size. These times series
have been recently made available by the BLS’ Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey
(JOLTS) program. Specifically, we calibrate the key turnover equations implied by a generic
dynamic job ladder model to fit the monthly time series of net and gross employment flows
by employer size. We extend our investigation to examine the GR and its aftermath, in
comparison with previous cyclical episodes.
We reach the following conclusions. First, the dynamic job ladder model, a parsimonious
setup built on some very strong assumptions, such as homogeneous labor and time-invariant
rank of each employer in the ladder, does a remarkable job at fitting the dynamics of employ-
ment across size classes. The estimated hiring intensity by employer size resembles vacancies
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by establishment size measured in JOLTS, but resolves some puzzling aspects of these data,
specifically the lack of vacancies at the small employer end. Second, a comprehensive assess-
ment of the evidence indicates that the job ladder has slowed down considerably since the
GR. The drastic decline in labor market turnover affected especially direct movements from
smaller, lower-paying to larger, higher-paying employers. Small employers suffered unusual
job losses, relative to large employers and a typical recession, mostly through an increase in
their layoffs, only partially compensated by resilient vacancy posting and hiring.
Further support to our hypothesis has been recently offered by Kahn and McEntar-
fer (2014). They exploit the matched employer-employee microdata from the Longitudinal
Employer-Household Dynamics at the US Census Bureau, to isolate the firm component of
wages and to track worker turnover over 1998-2011 at quarterly frequency. Like us, they
are interested in testing our dynamic job ladder hypothesis. They find that high-paying
firms grew faster during aggregate expansions, and shrank more quickly in the 2001 and
2008 busts. Low-paying firms were less sensitive to the aggregate unemployment rate. Fur-
thermore, this was due entirely to reduced separations in recessions: while low-paying firms
cut hiring more, their separations declined even more, relative to high-paying employers.
Because separations include layoffs, quits to non-employment, and quits to other jobs, and
the first two components are well-known to be countercyclical, this collapse in separations
at the bottom of the wage ladder in recessions could only be caused by a collapse in quits
to higher-paying firms.
We now provide details on our contributions. From an aggregate perspective, the GR
impacted the labor market as would any (deep) recession: job openings went down across
the board, job finding rates plummeted, and layoff rates temporarily spiked around the Fall
of 2008, as the financial crisis burst. As a result, unemployment soared. As we argued
and documented in our previous work, which covered past recessions, this pattern created
relatively favorable conditions for small, low-paying, less productive employers. High un-
employment meant that there was plenty of cheap labor for them to hire. The collapse in
aggregate job market tightness reduced not only the workers’ exit rate from unemployment,
as is well understood, but also the job-to-job quit rate. That is, employers at the bottom
of the job ladder were losing fewer workers to their larger, more productive, higher-paying
competitors.
Evidence on job openings and gross worker flows from JOLTS, the monthly Current
Population Survey (CPS) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
largely corroborates this view. Job-to-job transitions indeed went down markedly during the
GR. The ‘poaching intensity’ (share of new hires that come through a job-to-job transition)
declined sharply during and after the GR, especially so for larger employers. Finally, while
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the share of small establishments in total job openings remained roughly stable throughout
the GR (if anything, it went up a little), the vacancy yield of small employers sky-rocketed,
in sharp contrast to the comparatively modest (and vanishing) increase in the vacancy yield
of large establishments.
Yet — and this is where the GR differs from previous recessions — small employers
fared worse than large ones in terms of net employment growth. This unusually poor job
creation performance was the result of a brutal (temporary) increase in the layoff rate of
small employers around the Lehman Brothers episode (September 2008), the peak of the
financial crisis. While at that point layoff rates rose sharply at employers of all sizes, small
establishments stand out, possibly because they were hit especially hard by the credit crunch.
Those small employers that were still hiring did so relatively easily, and benefited from
relatively favorable conditions on the hiring and retention margins.
These findings suggest the following interpretation of the GR and its aftermath. Small
employers, especially existing ones, faced an unusual credit crunch that led to a wave of
layoffs, while the class of small employers as a whole, including entrants, kept hiring at
a healthy pace. The collapse in hiring by large employers froze job-to-job upgrading and
attrition up the job ladder, further taming the incentives of small employers to hire, despite
the abundant unemployment pool.
In Section 2 we present descriptive evidence on labor market flows across employers of
different sizes before, during and after the GR. In Section 3 we present the turnover equations
describing the business cycle dynamics of gross and net workers flows in a dynamic job ladder
model. We also briefly discuss structural equilibrium foundations for this process, and relate
it to the descriptive evidence. In Section 4 we describe our methodology to calibrate turnover
parameters and hiring intensity by firm size in the dynamic job ladder model, so that it
replicates the observed net and gross flows of employment by firm size. In Section 5 we
discuss our empirical results.
2 The dynamic job ladder: Descriptive evidence
We examine the cyclical reallocation of employment among firms and establishments, espe-
cially around the Great Recession, through the lens of the job ladder, namely, the turnover
process that occurs when all workers agree on a ranking of employers and face frictions
in finding and retaining jobs. We begin with descriptive empirical evidence. In order to
make the notion of a job ladder empirically operational, we need a measure of a ladder’s
“rung”. As workers move up the ladder, employers high in the ladder tend to accumulate
more employment, thus to be larger. We focus on an employer’s size as the main empirical
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counterpart of its position in the job ladder, because size is accurately and easily measurable
in the data, unlike other natural candidates such as productivity1 or compensation policy.
We present new evidence on the cyclicality of four relevant types of aggregate labor market
statistics, all broken down by employer size: employment shares; net job creation; gross job
flows (hires, quits, layoffs); and vacancy postings.
Before we proceed, as an important caveat, we emphasize that in our analysis we focus
on continuing employers and abstract from entry and exit. The reason for this choice is
threefold. First, and foremost, given our focus on cyclical employment variation, entry and
exit play a relatively minor role. While they are extremely important to determine average
job and worker flows,2 their contribution to cyclical movements in aggregate employment
is modest. In the Business Employment Dynamics3, the standard deviation of the net job
creation rate, HP-filtered with smoothing parameter 1600, is .48; if we focus on continuing
establishments, it drops, but to only .435. So the net contribution of entry and exit to total
net job creation is procyclical, but small.4 Second, the prime novel dataset that we employ
in this paper, JOLTS by establishment size, is a survey of pre-existing establishments, where
exit is by and large offset by a monthly sample rotation/refreshment scheme, while entry
does not contribute to the observations. Third, the equations describing workers’ movement
on a dynamic job ladder that we use for our calibration exercise are much simpler when
ignoring entry and exit, although both of them could be accommodated in a limited sense.
To begin, we motivate our hypothesis that size is one relevant (albeit, by no means,
the only possible) empirical counterpart of a job ladder rung. In the Appendix we provide
corroborating empirical evidence, drawing from the Quarterly Census of Employment and
Wages (QCEW)5 for establishments, and from Statistics of US Businesses (SUSB), an annual
census of all employers, for firms. First, it has long been documented that employer size
correlates positively with wage rates, after controlling for observable worker characteristics
1In the US, information on sales at the firm level, necessary to compute TFP, is not available for a
representative sample of firms from all industries.
2Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2013) document from an annual longitudinal census of US employers
that in fact entrants create on average more jobs than the whole economy, as continuing establishments and
exits on net destroy jobs.
3A collection of quarterly gross job flows published by the BLS, currently covering 1992Q3-2013Q1 and
nearly the entire US private sector.
4This conclusion is based on the extreme view that, one quarter after entry, new establishments are
similar to incumbent ones of the same size. More generally, entrants may face a different growth process
than incumbents early in their life cycle; in this case, a cyclical decline in entry may have long run effects
on aggregate job creation that are significantly larger than the small immediate impact that we document
here.
5QCEW is the primary source of information on businesses from the BLS. It publishes a quarterly count
of employment and wages reported by establishment size, covering 98% of U.S. jobs, both private and public
sector, available at the county, MSA, state and national levels by industry.
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(Brown and Medoff, 1989). We confirm that larger employer pay more. Second, as predicted
by the dynamic job ladder hypothesis, the share of employment at large firms or establish-
ments is procyclical: workers climb the job ladder faster in tight labor markets, when they
can make contact with employers at higher rate.
2.1 Worker flows by size
Our main focus in this paper is on business cycles and the resulting dynamic job ladder. In
order to measure worker flows by employer size, we need at least a modicum of longitudinal
links on firms/establishments and workers. JOLTS comprises about 16,000 establishments, a
size-stratified sample from the QCEW frame, surveyed every month according to a rotating
panel structure. JOLTS measures job openings, hires, layoffs, quits, and other separations
at the establishment level. Recently, the BLS published this information also by size of the
establishment, in one of six size classes, with lower bounds equal to 1, 10, 50, 250, 1000, and
5,000 employees. This dataset is central to our exercise.
In JOLTS, an establishment is assigned to a size class according to the maximum size
it attained in the 12 months preceding its inclusion in the sample, independently of how its
size changes while it is part of the sample.6 So, within each survey year we know that the
identity, hence the size quantiles of establishments in each size class are fixed.7 In the analysis
that follows, we will aggregate the largest two size categories available in the JOLTS sample
(1,000-4,999 and over 5,000 employees) into one single category (over 1,000 employees). We
do this for two main reasons. First, the largest size cutoff in the QCEW sample described
above is 1,000 employees. As we get our shares of private sector establishment counts from
QCEW, we will need to merge information from QCEW and JOLTS, which constrains us to
use size cutoffs that are available in both data sets. Second, the 5,000+ category in JOLTS
is very small (it accounts for less than 2.5% of total employment in the JOLTS sample and
covers few establishments), and the data pertaining to this category are somewhat noisy.
The loss of information implied by our aggregation of the largest two size classes into one is
therefore arguably relatively minor.
Finally, and importantly, we should mention that JOLTS by size class covers only the
private sector, while aggregate JOLTS data cover also the public sector, just like its QCEW
6JOLTS (re-)sampling dates are December 2000, December 2003, February 2005, March 2006, and every
March until 2013. A new JOLTS sample is put in place in the month following each re-sampling.
7Because this size classification follows an “initial employment” criterion, it is known to be subject to a
mean reversion bias creating the illusion of a negative size-growth relationship in the presence of a transitory
component to firm size. This issue is likely to matter more in narrower size classes, at the bottom of the
size distribution, where establishment size is more volatile. We will return to this issue when discussing size
misclassification.
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Solid, left scale = Differential net job creation (large minus small), MA−smoothed.
Dash, right scale = Unemployment rate, detrended.
Categories defined within each JOLTS sample as <50 and >1,000.
Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: JOLTS, BLS, and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 1: Differential employment growth between establishment size classes.
frame. This is an important caveat for the GR, where the public sector played a dispro-
portionate role in first buffering employment losses and then dragging on the employment
recovery.
Net flows. The cyclicality of employment shares of different firm size classes, presented in
the appendix, provides limited information on the size of businesses that were most affected
by the Great Recession: as we discussed in MPV12, to avoid the so-called reclassification
bias we need to study business dynamics for at least two consecutive periods among classes
to which employers are assigned based on their initial size. We showed there that the annual
growth rate of employment at initially large (>1,000 employees) minus small (<50 employees)
firms in the US is strongly negatively correlated with unemployment in 1979-2010. Here we
zoom in on the Great Recession using higher frequency, monthly data updated to cover the
post-GR recovery. Figure 1 repeats the exercise using JOLTS data by establishment size (we
remark again that these are establishments, not firms). The differential net job creation series
on Figure 1 follows a similar pattern as for previous recessions (see MPV12), but peaks later
in the GR, in fact at the very end of it, than one would have expected based on the evidence
reported in MPV12 for previous recessions. It thus appears that small establishments were
hit especially hard by the credit crunch.
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Gross flows. To examine in more detail the nature of these patterns, we turn to gross
worker flows. This is a unique advantage of JOLTS and, to the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to document the behavior of these flows by employer size around the GR. By
definition, net employment growth in JOLTS equals hires minus the sum of layoffs, quits
and other separations (such as retirement). The latter category is small and fairly acyclical,
thus we focus on hires, layoffs and quits. Figure 2 plots hire rates (new accessions divided
by employment) by establishment size.
Hire rates begin to decline before the GR. Surprisingly, during the deepest phase of the
financial crisis following the Lehmann Brothers episode, hire rates collapse at the larger
establishments and not at the smaller ones; they even briefly spike up in the smaller class
in late 2008-early 2009. Given that in Figure 1 smaller establishments fared worse in terms
of net employment growth, especially from the last quarter of 2008 on, it must be the case
that their separations rose disproportionately, and more than compensated their brisker
hiring pace. We in fact see in Figure 3 that layoff rates rose sharply and temporarily,
especially at small establishments. Although not immediately evident from the figure, the
increase in layoff rates was almost exactly proportional across all size classes. Because
smaller establishments report higher layoff rates on average, the absolute increase in layoff
rates during the GR was more pronounced at the bottom of the size ladder.
The third gross worker flow available in JOLTS, the quit rate, is shown on Figure 4. This
adds quits to non-employment and quits to other employers. While quit rates fell markedly
across the board both in 2001 and around 2008, the figure clearly suggests that the fall during
the GR was less sharp for small establishments than for large ones. This corroborates the
hypothesis that the worse performance of small establishments during the GR was entirely
driven by a spike in layoff rates, as opposed to higher quits or reduced hiring, which actually
worked in the opposite direction.
JOLTS, as a survey of employers, provides a meaningful distinction between layoffs and
quits, but not between quits to (or hires from) non-employment, as opposed to (from) other
jobs, a distinction that is crucial to the job ladder. We supplement JOLTS with information
on gross worker flows from the monthly CPS. Specifically, we use the hazard rates of tran-
sition between Employment (E), Unemployment (U) and Non participation (N) estimated
by Fallick and Fleischman (2004) from gross flows (using monthly matched files), starting
in January 1994 and updated by the authors through May 2014. This series begins with
the 1994 re-design of the CPS, which introduced a question on the change of employer that
made it possible to measure the EE hazard, and which greatly improved the reliability of
employment status and thus reduced margin error. Figure 5 plots the EE hazard. While it is
clearly procyclical and dropped significantly during the GR, the most striking aspect is the
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Fig. 2: Hire rates by establishment size class.
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Average hire rate by size class, MA−smoothed.
Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: JOLTS and authors’ calculations.
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Average layoff rate by size class, MA−smoothed.
Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: JOLTS and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 3: Layoff rates by establishment size class.
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Fig. 4: Quit rates by establishment size class.
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Average quit rate by size class, MA−smoothed.
Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: JOLTS and authors’ calculations.
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Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: CPS compiled by Fallick and Fleischman (2004), and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 5: Total employment-to-employment hazard.
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Fig. 6: Share of hires from other employers, by employer size
declining trend. Off that trend, the decline during the GR was not especially pronounced,
and the recovery afterwards was significant. But in abolute terms, i.e. without detrending,
the EE hazard remains at an all-time low almost five years into the post-GR recovery. It
is known that EE transitions include involuntary reallocation and other events that reduce
worker’s earnings (our model explicitly accommodates this possibility through reallocation
shocks — see Section 3). Therefore, per se they provide only limited information on the
extent to which workers climb the job ladder. It is, however, striking that this rate is the
most lagging labor market indicator post GR.
The CPS has no information on the size of a worker’s employer. For this, we turn to SIPP,
starting with the 1996 panel. We exploit the availability of start and end date of each job
to construct EE transition rates by size of the hiring “workplace”, the phrasing in the SIPP
questionnaire that we interpret to be an establishment. In Figure 6 we show the share of all
hires that are not from unemployment but directly from other employers, thus entail an EE
transition, by size of the hiring establishment. As predicted by the job ladder model, larger
employers always hire more from other employers, and less from non-employment, especially
so late in expansions when the market tightens and competition for workers stiffens. In the
GR, this “poaching” inflow share collapsed for all size groups. Since total hires also declined
sharply, this is the strongest evidence that the job ladder came to a grinding halt.
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Fig. 7: Vacancies by establishment size class.
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Vacancies by size class.
Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: JOLTS, and authors’ calculations.
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Vacancy shares by size class.
Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: JOLTS, and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 8: Vacancy shares by establishment size class.
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Fig. 9: Vacancy weights by establishment size class.
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Average vacancy weights by size class.
Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions. All series normalized at 1 in 01/2001.
Source: JOLTS, CEW, and authors’ calculations.
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Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: JOLTS and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 10: Vacancy yields by establishment size class.
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To take stock, we showed that net job creation by small establishments was especially
poor during the GR, relative to larger establishments and to a typical US recession, and
that this is due entirely to spike in their layoffs, while hires, total quits and quits to other
employers declined much less at the bottom of the size distribution.
2.2 Vacancies by size
We now return to JOLTS to describe the behavior of measured job vacancies by size class.
Vacancies are uniquely valuable as a direct measure labor demand, or intensity of hiring
effort, as opposed to outcomes. Figure 7 reports the time series of total job openings for
each JOLTS size class. Figure 8 further shows vacancy shares by size class, i.e. vacancies
in each size class divided by total aggregate vacancies. If recorded job openings are an
accurate measure of hiring effort,8 then the series plotted on Figure 8 will represent the
sampling probabilities of each size class. Next, Figure 9 shows vacancy shares divided by the
number of establishment in each class from QCEW, and normalized at one in January 2001
to harmonize scales. We refer to those series as the vacancy weights by size class. These
weights measure average hiring effort in each establishment size class, relative to aggregate
hiring effort.
Figure 7 clearly shows that vacancies plummeted across the board during the GR, with
vacancy levels seemingly tracking each other across the various size classes. At first glance,
Figures 8 and 9 reinforce that impression, as the movements in vacancy shares and weights
appear small relative to the absolute decline seen in Figure 7 which, to a first approximation,
was uniform. On closer inspection, Figures 8 and 9 further suggest that there is no evidence
of a disproportionate impact of the financial crisis (post-September 2008) on the hiring
effort of small establishments: the movements are relatively modest, and the 10-49 employee
class shows the largest change, but upwards. Overall, we conclude that hiring effort fell
proportionally at establishments of all sizes.
Finally, Figure 10 plots the vacancy yield, namely the ratio between hires and vacan-
cies reported a month before, by establishment size.9 Vacancy yields are countercyclical;
specifically, during and after the GR the aggregate yield rose enormously with unemploy-
ment duration, and it became as easy for firms to fill vacancies as it was difficult for the
unemployed to find work. Importantly, Figure 10 shows that this phenomenon was more
pronounced the smaller the establishment. During the acute phase of the GR, from the Fall
8There are good reasons to believe that they are not, as we discuss below in Section 4.
9Note that the yield is greater than 1 for many dates and size classes (Figure 10), suggesting that the
JOLTS measure of job openings misses something about true establishment hiring effort. This ties in with
the results of Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2010), who report that around 40% of hires occur at
establishments that do not report any job openings to JOLTS. We return to this issue below in Section 5.
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of 2008 onwards, the vacancy yield literally took off at establishments employing 1-9 workers.
At the largest establishments, however, the yield stopped rising. This surprising set of facts
is consistent with the collapse in hires from employment, on which larger establishments rely
more, but can also be explained by tightening hiring standards by those large employers.
3 The dynamic job ladder: Model
3.1 Flow equations
In order to interpret the evidence laid out in Section 2, we now propose a turnover account-
ing framework. This is a reduced-form model of employment dynamics, which is a shared
equilibrium prediction of several models of the labor market with on-the-job search. Time
t = 0, 1, 2 . . . is discrete. The labor market is populated by a unit measure of workers, who
can be either employed or unemployed, and who face a unit measure of firms. Workers agree
on a ranking of employers, which gives rise to a job ladder. Let x ∈ [0, 1] be the rank of a firm
in the job ladder: workers always prefer firms with higher x. The labor market is affected
by search frictions in that unemployed workers can only sample job offers sequentially with
some probability λt ∈ (0, 1) at time t. Employed workers draw each period with probability
s ∈ (0, 1] an i.i.d. opportunity to search on the job, thus face a per-period sampling chance of
job offers of sλt. Workers can only send one job application per period and can never receive
more than one offer in any period. Conditional on a contact, workers draw offers from a
sampling distribution with c.d.f. Ft (·), so Ft (x) is the chance that the worker meets an em-
ployer of rank below x. An employed worker is exogenously separated from his employer and
either, with probability δt (x), enters unemployment, or, with probability ρt, is immediately
reallocated to another job, drawn randomly from the available ones, without going through
unemployment. The displacement shock δt (x) encompasses both layoffs and quits to non
employment that result in a measurable unemployment spell. The reallocation shock ρt cap-
tures such events as moves due to spousal relocation, or displacements followed by immediate
re-hiring by another employer. The objects that govern worker turnover, Ft (·) , δt (·) , λt, ρt
are time-dependent realizations of stochastic processes. We are particularly interested in
their business cycle fluctuations.
Let Nt : [0, 1] → [0, 1] denote the c.d.f. of employment across firm types. So N0 (x) is
the date-0 measure of employment at firms of rank weakly below x, a given initial condition,
Nt (x) is the same measure at time t, Nt (1) is total employment, and ut = 1−Nt (1) is the
unemployment stock (or rate). Let
δ¯t (x) =
1
Nt−1 (x)
·
∫ x
0
δt (q) dNt−1 (q)
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denote the average transition rate into unemployment by workers currently at employers of
rank up to x. Applying a Law of Large Numbers to each firm rank, and the definition of
rank in a job ladder, we obtain equations for net and gross workers flows. We present the
equations in terms of cumulated employment Nt. Taking derivatives with respect to rank x
would provide the equivalent equations at each rank x (for each employer) in the job ladder.
We start with gross flows, the inflow into (outflow from) Unemployment from (resp., into)
employers of rank up to x:10
E to U flow: EUt+1 (x) = δ¯t+1 (x)Nt (x) (1)
U to E flow: UEt+1 (x) = λt+1Ft+1 (x) [1−Nt (1)] (2)
In the first line, the chance of exogenous separation δ¯t+1 (x) into Unemployment multiplies
the measure of employed workers. In the second line, the chance of job contact times the
chance that the contact is with a firm of rank no more than x multiplies the measure of
unemployed job searchers.
The third gross flow comprises workers who leave employers of rank at most x to join
another employer of any rank. In turn, this flow includes forced reallocations with chance
ρt+1 and voluntary quits:
E to E flow (Quits): QEt+1 (x) = ρt+1Nt (x) + sλt+1
∫ x
0
F t+1 (x
′) dNt (x′) (3)
To understand the integral term, note that a worker employed at rank x′ < x receives each
period with chance sλt+1 an outside offer, which is above rank x
′ (so the worker accepts)
with chance F t+1 (x
′) = 1−Ft+1 (x′). A measure dNt (x′) of workers were initially employed
at rank x′ < x. This is a gross outflow; some of these workers join other employers whose
rank is still below x, in some cases even below their current job’s rank, if the reallocation is
forced.
The last gross flow we could consider is the inflow from other employers into firms of rank
at most x. By an accounting identity, given the three gross flows above, this fourth one gives
rise to net job creation by such firms. Since the net flow is easier to measure empirically, we
focus on the latter, so the fourth gross flow is redundant. The net change in employment at
firms of rank up to x evolves as follows:
Nt+1 (x)−Nt (x) = −
[
δ¯t+1 (x) + ρt+1 + sλt+1F t+1 (x)
]
Nt (x)
+ {ρt+1Nt (1) + λt+1 [1−Nt (1)]}Ft+1 (x) . (4)
10In the notation just laid out, we use the letter U to imply non-employment. The model is silent on any
possible distinction between unemployment and non-employment. We will return to this issue momentarily.
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The first line includes outflow from firms of rank below x due to either exogenous turnover,
to unemployment δ¯t+1 (x) and other employers ρt+1, or to outside offers received from firms
of rank above x. The second line includes the inflow into firms of rank below x, which
are sampled with probability Ft+1 (x) either by workers who are forced-reallocated or by
the unemployed. Notice that the voluntary inflow from other employer is omitted from the
second line, because it can only occur from below x, so it can at best reshuﬄe the mass of
employment below x, but not increase it.
To make Equations (1)-(4) empirically operational, we need a measure of job ladder rank.
We do not observe the workers’ preferences that define the job ladder, so we rely on their
revealed preferences. Because workers climb the job ladder, from lower to higher ranked em-
ployers, while the contact rates sλt and the forced reallocation rate ρt are rank-independent,
this turnover process makes higher-ranked firms also larger in terms of employment measure.
Thus, when given the opportunity, employed workers tend to move from smaller to larger
employers. Exogenous forced reallocations to unemployment and to other employers inter-
fere with this upgrading process, and maintain a non-degenerate ergodic size distribution
of employers. In order to guarantee that higher rank means larger size in the model, thus
to use firm size as an empirical proxy for rank, we further assume that the inflow rate into
unemployment δt (x) is non-increasing in rank x. This assumption encompasses as special
cases exogenous separations at flat, rank-independent probability δt, as well as endogenous
separations due to match-specific shocks, because workers must be more reluctant to endoge-
nously give up higher-ranked jobs if they are more willing to accept them to begin with. We
can then proceed to estimate turnover rates from Equations (1)-(4) using data on employ-
ment stocks, net and gross worker flows, broken down by employer size. Before doing so, we
briefly discuss structural foundations of the dynamic job ladder, namely of the accounting
Equations (1)-(4), and how they relate to the descriptive evidence illustrated earlier.
3.2 Structural foundations
Equations (1)-(4) describe the accounting of worker flows in a job ladder, namely, in an
environment where all workers agree on the ranking of employers. This type of turnover
process occurs in different frictional models of the labor markets. The prime, but by no
means the only example is a wage-posting model. The canonical framework for the analysis of
frictional wage dispersion with on-the-job search is Burdett and Mortensen (1998, henceforth
BM). This setup has strong implications also for worker turnover and for the distribution
of firm size, where a firm is identified by a wage policy constrained to pay all workers
the same. In particular, the unique steady state equilibrium of the BM model features a
job ladder by employer size. In MPV09 and MPV13 we introduce aggregate uncertainty
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in BM, and accordingly identify a firm as a wage policy, which may now vary with the
state of the aggregate economy, the size of the firm, and the distribution of wage offers by
competitors.11 In the ergodic steady state of the stochastic economy, the unique equilibrium
is always Rank-Preserving. That is, a firm that is larger, and possibly permanently more
productive, will always commit to a stream of payments of higher value to workers, who
then move on a dynamic job ladder, from smaller, lower-paying to larger, high-paying firms,
at all points of the business cycle. Because larger firms pay more and are ranked higher by
workers, equilibrium preserves a stable ranking by size, although not necessarily a stable size
distribution. In this model, firm-level productivity is a natural, although by no means the
only, primitive that determines the rank on the ladder.
Coles and Mortensen (2013) introduce idiosyncratic shocks to firm productivity in a
model that is very close to MPV13’s wage-posting framework, and show the existence of
a Rank-Preserving Equilibrium. In other business cycle models of frictional labor markets
with on the job search, workers agree in equilibrium on the ranking of jobs (matches) at each
points in time. The allocation of jobs into employers is somewhat indeterminate, but can
be chosen to generate a dynamic job ladder and size distribution. Robin (2011) introduces
aggregate uncertainty in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)’s sequential auction model of the
labor market, where firms commit to wage offers but can respond to outside offers to their
employees. All of these models feature random matching. Menzio and Shi (2011) obtain
similar implications in a directed search framework.
3.3 Revisiting the descriptive evidence
These structural models naturally dovetail with the stylized facts illustrated in the previous
section. Wages are increasing in employer size, with causality running primarily from the
former to the latter (paying workers more attracts and retains more of them), but also in the
other direction. For example, in MPV13 a larger firm is willing to pay more its new hires to
retain its larger labor force, under the equal-treatment constraint. A procyclical job contact
rate λt and weakly countercyclical separation rate into unemployment δt (·) then imply that
workers climb the job ladder faster, and fall off the ladder less often, in expansions, and vice
versa in recessions. Hence, both the extra net job creation and the employment share of
larger employers, those that are located higher on the ladder, are procyclical. Employer to
employer transitions are directed up the size ladder. Job ladder models are mostly silent on
separations into unemployment, which are assumed exogenous. The cyclicality of vacancy
postings and hires by size are more difficult to discern qualitatively, and require estimating
the model, which is the objective of the next section.
11This structural model does not, but can easily extended to, include reallocation shocks with chance ρt.
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An important role in our analysis is played by reallocation shocks, which move workers
directly from employer to employer without any measurable unemployment spell. These
shocks are meant to capture in the data the sizable flows of workers who move in opposite
directions among employers of different sizes, a phenomenon that is inconsistent with the
idea of a job ladder in its most extreme form. One restriction imposed by Equation (4)
is that of a rank-independent chance ρt of reallocation shocks. Since employed workers
voluntarily quit to accept an outside offer with probability that decreases in the rank of
their current employer, they all move from job to job in the same direction (up, towards
larger employers) on average, although not with probability one. This is a key prediction
that we will test. Another restriction is the rank-independent relative efficiency of employed
and unemployed job search, s. This can be interpreted as a time endowment available to all
employed workers, no matter where currently employed, to search and interview for other
jobs. An alternative interpretation, which would not be consistent with our assumptions, is
that workers control their job search effort, in which case we should expect s to decline in
rank x, as lower-ranked jobs, starting with unemployment at the bottom of the ladder, are
less desirable and motivate more search effort. By assuming a constant s we attribute all
time variation in job contact rates from employment to that in job market tightness, and
all cross-sectional variation in turnover rates among workers to their different positions on
the job ladder: all workers receive offers at the same rate, but differ in their willingness to
accept them.
In the next section, we investigate whether the job ladder hypothesis can be rejected, or
conversely there exists a calibration of model objects such that the resulting job ladder is
consistent with gross worker flows by employer size each month over a long time period.
4 The dynamic job ladder: Calibration
We calibrate the job ladder model using a minimum distance method. Our target empirical
moments are gross and net employment flows by size class of the employer observed in
JOLTS. Given our strong assumptions implying that employer size is a relevant rung of
the job ladder, it is far from obvious that the job ladder dynamic Equations (1)-(4) can
replicate actual observations on gross and net flows, every month for 12 years, for several
size classes. Among many restrictions, our theory predicts that smaller employers should
lose a larger proportion of workers to job-to-job quits. Testing all joint restrictions of the job
ladder equation is our main goal here. In addition to the parameter s (the search intensity of
employed relative to unemployed workers), Equations (1)-(4) involve six time series — δ¯t (·),
λt, ρt, Ft (·), Nt (·), and the size of the labor force, that in the model we normalized to one,
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but is time-varying in the data, or, equivalently, the size of employment and unemployment,
given the unemployment rate 1 − Nt (1). We now explain how we map monthly empirical
observations into our time series of interest. While some of them can be estimated directly,
we need the model to back up ρt, Ft (·) and s.
4.1 Size ranks
Assuming for the time being that employer size is correctly measured, and that size does
reflect rank in the job ladder (i.e., workers always prefer larger employers, when they can
choose), establishments in a given JOLTS size class k = 1, 2, · · · , K will be representative
of all establishments with ranks between two unobserved cutoff values, x ∈ [Xk−1, Xk], with
{Xk}Kk=1 an increasing sequence in [0, 1], which remain fixed so long as the identities of
establishments assigned to size class k do not change. In JOLTS, each month except at
re-sampling dates, 1/12 of the surveyed establishments are replaced with ex ante identical
establishments, which had the same size and industry at the time of sampling; under the
assumption, underlying this gradual rotation scheme, that these are statistically equivalent
establishments, we can effectively treat the identities and size class membership of the JOLTS
establishments as constant between re-sampling times.
The JOLTS sample thus provides observations at (almost) all dates of cumulated em-
ployment Nt (Xk), layoffs, and total quits (and, potentially, sampling probabilities Ft (Xk)
— see below), for K job ladder rank quantiles {Xk}Kk=1 corresponding to K size classes.12
In what follows, we should keep in mind that Xk is the cutoff quantile between size classes
k and k+ 1. With K size classes, this implies that XK ≡ 1. We will also use the convention
X0 = 0. We now confront Equations (4)-(3) with the JOLTS sample.
4.2 Separations into non-employment
A survey of employers like JOLTS reveals whether a separation is a quit or a layoff from
the viewpoint of the surveyed establishment. As workers are neither interviewed nor tracked
after a separation, measured quits are the sum of quits to unemployment and quits to other
jobs, a distinction that is central to the logic of the job-ladder model, where the former are
part of total separations into unemployment δ¯t+1 (x)Nt (x), and the latter are upgrades. To
estimate δ¯t+1 (x), we thus need some way to break down quits into those to unemployment
and those to other employers. To do so, we need worker-side information.
12As discussed earlier, the raw JOLTS sample has six establishment size classes: 1 to 9, 10 to 49, 50 to
249, 250 to 999, 1,000 to 4,999, and over 5,000 employees. For reasons discussed earlier, we lump the largest
two classes into one.
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Focusing first on the aggregate separation rate (up to rank x = 1), we seek to construct
δ¯t+1 (1) based on Equation (1) as the ratio between the total monthly flow from employment
to non-employment and the total stock of employment. The flow consists of layoffs plus quits
into non-employment. We supplement the JOLTS data with the transition rates estimated
from CPS by Fallick and Fleischman (2004), updated by the authors through 2014. For
every month t we compute the share σCPSt of total transitions that are employer-to-employer
(EE), as opposed to transitions into non-employment (say, EU):
σCPSt =
EECPSt
EECPSt + EU
CPS
t
.
All EE transitions are quits in the job ladder model; some are voluntary upgrades, others
are forced reallocations. Assuming that the CPS-based share σCPSt applies to the workers
employed by the JOLTS sample of establishments, we multiply total separations in JOLTS
by 1 − σCPSt to obtain an estimate of aggregate separations into non-employment, EUt (1),
that is consistent with the JOLTS data. The corresponding aggregate separation rate is then
δ¯t+1 (1) = EUt (1) /Nt (1).
13
This procedure further gives us the share of all EU separations that are quits. As men-
tioned earlier, JOLTS has a measure of total layoffs and discharges, which we can subtract
from our newly constructed time series EUt (1) to obtain total quits into non-employment in
JOLTS. Substracting from total quits, we obtain a JOLTS-based measure of quits to other
employers. We now introduce the ancillary — yet economically meaningful — parameters
ψt (x), defined as the share of total EU separations from employers of rank x that are quits
to non-employment, and
ψ¯t (x) =
1
δ¯t (x)Nt−1 (x)
·
∫ x
0
δt (x
′)ψt (x′) dNt−1 (x′) ,
the same share from employers of rank up to x. In this notation, ψ¯t+1 (1) is the share of quits
in aggregate separations into non-employment, EUt (1), that we obtain from our procedure.
The aggregate layoff probability is then δ¯t+1 (1)·
(
1− ψ¯t+1 (1)
)
, and the probability of quitting
into non-employment is δ¯t+1 (1) ψ¯t+1 (1). Both of those, plus the total aggregate transition
rate into non-employment δ¯t+1 (1), are plotted in Figure 11.
14 While most of this figure has
the familiar feature of a largely a-cyclical probability of transition into non-employment, the
13To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to exploit information from both the employer
and the employee sides to draw empirically the distinction between the three main types of separations:
layoffs, quits to non-employment, and quits to other employers. Worker surveys such as CPS and SIPP
are notoriously plagued by noise in the layoff/quit distinction when the worker loses a job. Administrative
datasets do not typically contain information about the reason for separation.
14All the raw JOLTS series are smoothed using a 6-month moving average around each point prior to
calibration, to remove the fairly large amount of high-frequency noise in those series.
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Fig. 11: Average separation rate into non-employment δt+1 (1) and its components
GR stands out as a striking exception, with a sudden (and short-lived) surge in layoffs in
the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
The Fallick and Fleischman (2004) series are only available at the aggregate level. There-
fore, making our quit/layoff distinction operational at lower levels of size aggregation (x < 1,
which we shall need later in the calibration) requires additional assumptions. The identi-
fying assumption that we opt for here is that the probability with which workers quit into
non-employment, ψt+1 (x) δt+1 (x), is independent of their employer’s rank x. That is to
say, for all x, ψt+1 (x) δt+1 (x) ≡ ψ¯t+1 (1) δ¯t+1 (1). Since the total separation rate into non-
employment δt+1 (x) is non-increasing in (size) rank x, this assumption implies that both
total separation rates and layoff rates are decreasing in x. Both implications hold in the
JOLTS data.15 This additional identifying assumption enables us to construct total separa-
tions into non-employment from employers with rank up to Xk, namely δ¯t+1 (Xk)Nt (Xk),
for all cutoff quantiles Xk corresponding to the JOLTS size classes, as the sum of total lay-
offs from employers in size classes up to k (directly available from the JOLTS data), plus
15Any assumption we make at this point is necessarily arbitrary to some degree. An alternative is to
assume that the share of EU separations that are quits is independent of rank, i.e. that ψt+1 (x) ≡ ψ¯t+1 (1)
for all x. This implies that not only the layoff rate, but also the quit rate into non-employment is decreasing
in employer size, or rank thereof. Results based on this alternative assumption, available upon request, are
qualitatively identical, and quantitatively very close, to the ones we present here.
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total quits into non-employment from those employers, equal to ψ¯t+1 (1) δ¯t+1 (1)Nt (Xk) by
assumption. Given observations on the cumulated employment distribution Nt (Xk), this
allows to directly estimate the desired total probability of transition into non-employment
by size class, δ¯t+1 (Xk).
4.3 Job contact probability
Equation (4) applied to the top quantile x = 1 gives the law of motion of aggregate employ-
ment: Nt+1 (1) =
[
1− δ¯t+1 (1)
]
Nt (1) + λt+1Ut, where Ut = 1 − Nt (1) is non-employment.
From this equation, we can back out the job finding rate from non-employment, which is
also the baseline job contact rate:
λt+1 =
Nt+1 (1)−
[
1− δ¯t+1 (1)
]
Nt (1)
Ut
=
UEt (1)
Ut
.
Construction of λt+1 from this equation thus requires knowledge of the stock of non-employed
job seekers, Ut. Here again, we call on the Fallick and Fleischman (2004) CPS series, which
offers a breakdown of the total non-employment to employment flow (UEt (1) in our nota-
tion) into the flow from unemployment into employment and the flow from inactivity into
employment. Taking the (average) ratio of the latter to the former gives us an estimate
of the relative job finding rate of inactive workers to the unemployed, say s0, so that the
job finding probability of non-participants is s0λt+1, we then construct the effective pool of
non-employed job seekers as:
Ut
Nt (1)
=
uCPSt
1− uCPSt
+ s0
(
1− eCPSt
eCPSt
− u
CPS
t
1− uCPSt
)
,
where uCPSt is the CPS unemployment rate and e
CPS
t is the CPS employment-population
ratio. The value of s0 thus calibrated is 0.2, and the resulting job finding rate series is
plotted in Figure 12. While it exhibits the familiar cyclicality, including a vertiginous drop
during the GR, its level is fairly low because it includes transitions to employment from
inactivity, which are a small fraction of the stock of inactive individuals.
4.4 Sampling distribution and employer-to-employer transitions
We now turn to the last, and arguably most salient, gross flow of workers predicted by the job
ladder, namely job-to-job quits QEt (x), given in Equation (3). We show how this equation,
combined with the net flow Equation (4) and with the JOLTS data, allows identification of
the sampling distribution Ft+1 (·), the reallocation shock ρt+1, and the relative intensity of
employed search, s.
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Fig. 12: Job finding rate λt+1
One easy option to estimate the sampling distribution Ft+1 (·) would be to set it equal
to the observed distribution of job openings by size class, which is readily available from
JOLTS. However, the sampling distribution that is consistent with the model will only
coincide with the empirical distribution of job openings if (a) job openings are measured
accurately in JOLTS, and (b) job opening counts are a good measure of actual hiring effort
(in particular, all vacancies have equal sampling weights). Both of these are questionable
assumptions: for example, Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2010) have recently forcefully
argued that neither was true, especially at the low end of the establishment size distribution.
Vacancies posted by different types of establishments may have different visibility, or small
establishments may rely more on informal hiring channels, rather than vacancies.
Luckily, the law of motion of employment in RPE offers an alternative solution to estimate
Ft+1 (·). Equation (4) defines the sampling distribution at cutoff quantiles Xk and at all dates
as:
F t+1 (Xk) =
[Nt+1 (1)−Nt+1 (Xk)]− (1− ρt+1) [Nt (1)−Nt (Xk)] + δ¯t+1 (1)Nt (1)− δ¯t+1 (Xk)Nt (Xk)
ρt+1Nt (1) + sλt+1Nt (Xk) + λt+1Ut
(5)
that we will use to estimate sampling probabilities Ft (·), employed search efficiency s, and
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reallocation shocks ρt+1, using the time series for separation and accession probabilities
δ¯t+1 (Xk) and λt+1, and the stock of non-employment from CPS, Ut, all estimated as above,
plus the stock of employment Nt (Xk) in size classes up to k from JOLTS. Later, we will gauge
how close the estimated sampling distribution from (5) (consistent with RPE employment
dynamics by construction) is to the empirical distribution of job openings across size classes.
Knowledge of the sampling distribution Ft (·) allows the construction of total job-to-job
quits in any size class k which, following Equation (3), equal
QEt (Xk)−QEt (Xk−1) = ρt+1 [Nt (Xk)−Nt (Xk−1)] + sλt+1
∫ Xk
Xk−1
F t+1 (x) dNt (x) , (6)
The empirical counterpart are total quits in JOLTS size class k, minus quits into non-
employment from employers in that size class, which were estimated in subsection 4.2 as
ψ¯t+1 (1) δ¯t+1 (1) · [Nt (Xk)−Nt (Xk−1)]. Fitting (6) to this JOLTS counterpart at each date t
and size class k allows, in principle, to identify both the (constant across dates and classes)
search intensity of employed workers s and the (constant across classes) reallocation shock
ρt.
This last statement must be qualified as follows. First, in order to limit the computational
cost of this calibration, and to attain more precise identification, we further restrict the
reallocation probability ρt to equal a constant (ρ) times the baseline job finding rate λt.
While not strictly necessary, this restriction considerably reduces the number of parameters
to estimate, from one value of ρt for each month in the sample (140 in total) down to a
single scalar, ρ. This restriction follows, for example, if ρ is the probability that the worker’s
spouse is seeking a better job that would require the entire household to move, a job search
that is successful with probability λt. Second, Equation (6) is not exactly implementable,
as the transformed net flow Equation (5) only gives the sampling distribution at the cutoff
quantiles Xk, whereas in principle we would need it over its entire support to calculate the
integral in (6). We approximate the integral using a simple trapezoidal rule on the grid of
points at which Ft (·) is known.
4.5 Misclassification
The issue. So far we assumed that an establishment’s size, as measured in JOLTS, is the
“relevant” measure of size, in the sense that it reflects the relevant rank of that establish-
ment. There are at least two reasons to doubt that this is always the case. The first one is
random fluctuations in establishment size. While the job ladder model uses a large number
approximation and treats establishment size as evolving deterministically over time, in real-
ity establishment size will fluctuate randomly around the mean value predicted by the job
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ladder. If, at the time of JOLTS re-sampling, an establishment has an exceptionally high
(say) realization of the random component of its size, that establishment may be assigned to
the “wrong” size class, i.e. to a size class that reflects its transitory larger size rather than
its long-run smaller size. This will be especially true of smaller establishments, both because
the large-number approximation is less accurate for small establishment, and also because
the small size classes (1-9 and 10-49 employees) are narrower than the larger ones.16
The second reason to suspect that establishment size does not perfectly reflect the rele-
vant rank in the ladder is that many establishments are part of multi-establishment firms.
Depending on the degree of decentralization and devolution in the parent firm’s management,
the relevant rank for those establishments may be at the level of the parent firm, in which
case the size measure that will best reflect rank is not the size of the establishment, but
that of the parent firm, which we do not observe in JOLTS. Indeed, in MPV12 we document
from the Census’ Business Dynamics Statistics that the average size of an establishment first
grows with the size of the parent company, but levels at about 60 employees when the size of
the firm reaches 250, and is still about 60 workers per establishment at firms employing over
10,000 workers in total. So very large firms own hundreds or even thousands of separate,
relatively small establishments (national banks and retailers come to mind), whose workers
benefit from the productivity and compensation policy of the parent company.17
For both reasons, observed size classes in JOLTS and true rungs on the job ladder may
not coincide. We propose to tackle those two issues and to reconcile size and rank classes
by modeling misclassification explicitly. To avoid confusion, we now introduce a distinction
between size class k, defined based on the JOLTS sample as the set of establishments whose
observed size falls between two given cutoff values (e.g. 50 to 249 employees), and rank class
k, defined as the set of establishments whose unobserved rank on the job ladder falls within
the quantile interval [Xk−1, Xk].
Modeling misclassification. Consider an establishment with job ladder rank x, whose
“true” (or model-predicted) size at date t is `t (x) = dNt (x) /dx. We assume that this
establishment’s observed size is the true size `t (x
′) of an establishment with rank x′ drawn
16Mean-reverting innovations in establishment size are easily detected by the size/growth relationship.
While growth in an establishment’s employment is strongly decreasing in its beginning-of-period size, it is
nearly uncorrelated with the average size of the same establishment over the same period. Hence, Gibrat’s
law holds approximately, and the negative size/growth relationship originates from a classic regression to
the mean fallacy.
17In his discussion of our paper, using administrative data from Denmark, Rasmus Lentz mentioned that
the variation of wages across the establishments of a typical firm, although not zero, is substantially lower
than in the population of establishments as a whole. The variation of establishment size, on the other hand,
is almost as large within a firm as in the wider population of establishments. We thank Rasmus Lentz for
pointing out this evidence, which speaks to the misclassification issue.
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at random from some conditional distribution M (x′|x) which, to attain identification, we
assume to be time-invariant. To lighten notation, we now drop the time index, but we should
keep in mind that employment measures, observed or reclassified, are time-varying, while
the reclassification distribution M is assumed constant over time.
Size classes with misclassification. Next consider size classes. We can define size
class k as the set of all establishments whose observed size `o falls within some interval
[`(Xk−1), `(Xk)]. Observed employment in size class k is therefore:
nokt =
∫ 1
0
mk (x) `t (x) dx, (7)
where mk(x) = M (Xk | x)−M (Xk−1 | x) for all x ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of an establish-
ment of rank x being observed as belonging to size class k.
To gain some tractability and amenability to calibration, we further restrict misclassifi-
cation weights mk(x) to be constant within rank classes, i.e. we impose mk(x) ≡ mk|k′ for
x ∈ [Xk′−1, Xk′ ]. With this approximation,18 (7) becomes:
nokt =
K∑
k′=1
mk|k′nk′t,
where nkt = Nt (Xk)−Nt (Xk−1) is true employment in rank class k.
Collating all rank classes, our misclassification model implies:
not :=
no1tno2t...
noKt
 =
m1|1 m1|2 · · · m1|Km2|1 m2|2 · · · m2|K... . . . ...
mK|1 mK|2 · · · mK|K
n1tn2t...
nKt
 := Mnt, (8)
which in turn implies that “true” employment in rank class k can be inferred from observed
employment in size class k as nt = M
−1not . Misclassification weights mk|k′ (the entries of
the matrix M) are unknown, and added to the set of parameters to calibrate.19
Measurement equations with misclassification. The transition rates λt, δ¯t (1) are es-
timated only off aggregate magnitudes and are not sensitive to size misclassification. With
our assumption of a rank-independent probability of quitting into non-employment, neither
is said probability (ψ¯t (1) δ¯t (1)). Misclassification, however, does affect observed job-to-job
18This is necessarily an approximation, as the boundaries of size classes in terms of productivity, the Xk’s,
are likely to change at each JOLTS re-sampling date.
19Note that by construction:
∑K
k=1mk|k′ = 1 for all k
′.
26
quits from establishments in class k. To see how, note that observed total quits, to non-
employment and to other jobs, from employers in rank class k are:
Qokt =
∫ 1
0
[
ψ¯t+1 (1) δ¯t+1 (1) + ρt+1 + sλt+1F t+1 (x)
]
mk (x) dNt (x) .
Under the assumption of constant misclassification weights in each rank class and over time,
the expression for total observed quits from class k becomes:
Qokt =
(
ψ¯t+1 (1) δ¯t+1 (1) + ρt+1
)
nokt + sλt+1
K∑
k′=1
mk|k′
∫ Xk′
Xk′−1
F t+1 (x) dNt (x) .
This implies:
sλt+1

∫ X1
X0=0
F t+1 (x) dNt (x)
...∫ XK=1
XK−1
F t+1 (x) dNt (x)
 = M−1Q?t ,
where M is the conversion matrix defined in (8), and the vector Q?t has K elements:
Q?kt = Q
o
kt −
(
ψ¯t+1 (1) δ¯t+1 (1) + ρt+1
)
nokt
Dividing by employment in rank class k and using nt = M
−1not we thus obtain
sλt+1
∫ Xk
Xk−1
F t+1 (x)
dNt (x)
nkt
=
Q?kt
nkt
. (9)
This equation highlights the importance of introducing misclassification in our JOLTS data.
The l.h.s. of (9) is the conditional expectation of F t+1 (x) within rank class k; the r.h.s. is
a measure of the rate of job-to-job quits from the size class that are motivated by better
offers. The job-ladder model predicts unambiguously that both sides of the equation should
be decreasing in size class k: larger employers are ranked higher and have an easier time
retaining employees. Because ψ¯t+1 (1) δ¯t+1 (1) + ρt+1 is constant across size classes k, this
requires total quits to decline in k. In the JOLTS data by establishment size, which is split
into six size classes, the observed quit rate, Qokt/n
o
kt actually increases between size classes
k = 1 and k = 2 in all months, and often during the sample period also between k = 2 and
k = 3. We reconcile these observations with the job ladder by allowing some of the small
establishments to be part of very large firms.
4.6 Implementation: Summary
For given reallocation shock arrival rate ρλt, search efficiency s and misclassification weights
M, using observations on employment stocks and total quits by size class, we can calculate
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Q?kt, and the cumulated sampling probabilities at size cutoffs F t (Xk) from (5) (using nt =
M−1not ). We then look for values of ρt, s, and M that minimize the distance between both
sides of (9) over the entire sample period.20 This final stage of our calibration protocol thus
uses 3K + 2 parameters (the 3K independent entries of M plus ρ and s) to match a number
of moments equal to K times the number of months in our sample (the K moments in (9)
in each month). With K = 4 size classes, this adds up to 14 parameters and 580 moments.
5 Results
We find that no sensible misclassification scheme can easily remedy the basic fact that the
total quit rate from the smallest establishment size class in JOLTS, “1-9 employees”, is
significantly lower than that from the second-largest class, “10-49 employees”. In the data,
it appears that a large group of small establishments have unexpectedly (based on the job-
ladder model) low rates of attrition; therefore, their size is not an accurate reflection of their
rank or desirability. The reason may be that small employers are largely of a different nature
than larger one, and more likely to “break ranks” and not comply with the job ladder. For
example, these small establishments may be young and growing and not have joined yet their
long-run size class.21 At the other end, the largest class of establishments with more than
5,000 employees has a very small sample size in JOLTS and is therefore somewhat noisy.
For both reasons, to calibrate the model we aggregate size of JOLTS establishments into
K = 4 classes: 1-49, 50-249, 250-999, and at least 1,000 employees. This partition, albeit
coarser, still allows for significant heterogeneity, and can be fitted quite well by the job-ladder
model. While we acknowledge the simple job ladder model’s inability to accurately describe
quits at the lower end of the size distribution as an unambiguous failure of the model, we still
argue that this model, given its parsimony, does a remarkable job of simultaneously fitting
the level and cyclicality of both gross and net unemployment flows by four, very different
size classes.
5.1 Calibration Results
Estimates of the various rates of separation into non-employment and of the job finding rate
were already shown in Sub-sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Here we report estimates of the
20In so doing, we add a penalty term to the criterion that we minimize (the norm of the difference between
the two sides of (9)) to avoid large values of ρt that would imply negative corrected net quits Q
?
kt at some
dates, for the highest productivity class K.
21As a manifestation of a similar phenomenon in the Danish matched employer-employee dataset IDA,
the wage-size relationship is monotonically increasing except at the very beginning, as very small firms pay
higher wages than slightly larger ones. We thank our discussant Rasmus Lentz for pointing out this parallel.
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Size Job ladder rank class k
range 1 2 3 4
1-49 0.977 0.000 0.000 0.651
M 50-249 0.023 0.846 0.000 0.000
250-999 0.000 0.154 1.000 0.000
1,000 plus 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.349
ρ 0.0145 Sample mean of ρλt = 0.0021
s 0.2034 Sample mean of sλt = 0.0300
Table 1: Parameter estimates
remaining scalar parameters, namely the relative intensity of reallocation shocks ρ = ρt/λt
and search by employed workers s, and the conversion matrix M, i.e. the misclassification
weights mk|k′ , (k, k′) ∈ {1, · · · , K}2. All those values are gathered in Table 1.
The misclassification weights in Table 1 suggest that high-rank establishments (from rank
class K = 4) have the largest (0.65) probability of being misclassified, and almost always
mistaken for establishments from size class 1 (1-49 employees). Apart from rank class 4,
the estimated conversion matrix M has most of its weight on the diagonal, suggesting that
misclassification is less of an issue for low to intermediate rank levels (classes k = 1 to 3).
This finding is consistent with an interpretation of misclassification as arising primarily from
the establishment/firm distinction, as some very productive — and large — firms are split
into many small establishments, very often no larger than 50 employees. The calibrated
matrix M places some small weight on the subdiagonal, meaning that some establishments
are actually seen as larger than their productivity would warrant under the job ladder
assumption. We interpret this as a consequence of transitory noise or measurement error in
establishment size: for example, an establishment whose long-run size is, say, 248 (and thus
would normally belong to size class 2), can temporarily be seen reaching a size slightly above
250, and thus be misclassified into size class 3 (recall that JOLTS assigns establishments to
size classes according to the largest size achieved over the 12 months prior to sampling).22
The relative search intensity of employed workers is calibrated at s = 0.203, a value which
is in the region of typical estimates based on worker micro data. This puts the sample mean
monthly probability of receiving an outside offer to 0.03. Finally, the reallocation shock
intensity is estimated to equal ρ = 0.0145. This value may seem small when compared, for
22To adhere more strictly to the large firms/small establishments interpretation, we can also calibrate
the model imposing that M be upper-triangular. Imposing this constraint only affects the model fit very
marginally, and produces visually identical results (available upon request).
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instance, to the value of s, however it still implies that the share of EE transitions that are
forced reallocations (as opposed to voluntary transitions), is about a half (49.7% on average).
This share is calculated as the sample mean of
ρλtNt (1)
ρλtNt (1) + sλt
∫ 1
0
F (x) dNt (x)
.
The relatively large value of this share, given the relatively high odds of receiving an outside
offer vs. a reallocation shock (s:ρ is about 14:1), indicates that many offers are rejected by
employed workers. This, in turn, is a consequence of the fact that the sampling distribution
of productive types Ft (·) is skewed toward the lower end of its support. We now turn to the
analysis of that distribution, and the corresponding EE quit patterns.
5.2 Establishment sampling probabilities and quit patterns
Figure 13 plots the r.h.s. of (9), namely the estimated values of sλt+1F (Xk), for k = 1, · · · , 4
(solid lines), together with the l.h.s. of (9), Q?kt/nkt (dashed lines), thus offering a pictorial
assessment of the job ladder’s capacity to fit the quit patterns by establishment size observed
in the JOLTS sample. Figure 14 further plots the estimated sampling c.d.f. F (Xk) for
k = 1, · · · , 4 (solid lines), together with F JOLTS (Xk) (dashed lines), the empirical c.d.f. of
job openings, directly taken from the JOLTS data, corrected for misclassification using the
probabilities and weights as explained earlier in this section. The vertical dotted lines on
Figure 14 indicate JOLTS re-sampling dates.
We can see in Figure 13 that our calibration ensures that the sampling distribution
constructed by fitting the RPE dynamic Equation (5) to net employment flow data from
JOLTS is by and large consistent with the gross flow data on quits over the period covered
by JOLTS. Although the data exhibit a slight downward trend in the EE quit rates of the
highest two rank classes (3 and 4) which the model fails to fully capture, we still conclude
that the model, including its correction for the misclassification of employers into size classes,
offers a remarkably good description of this data, especially considering its parsimony. In
particular, EE transition rates, once corrected for misclassification, are indeed neatly ordered
by rank class, as predicted by the job ladder model. We stress that this outcome was not at
all guaranteed ex-ante.
A further striking lesson from Figure 13 is that job-to-job exit rates from all but the
highest rank class declined sharply during the GR, especially at the lower end, and remained
low thereafter. Again, our simple job ladder model captures this pattern well, albeit with a
slight lag for the lowest rank class, k = 1. This is one of our central findings: the GR was
a time when job-to-job quit rates declined sharply, not only in the aggregate as was already
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Vertical dotted lines indicate JOLTS re−sampling dates.
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Fig. 14: The sampling distribution.
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known, but especially from smaller, less productive employers. Because these are always the
main source of job-to-job reallocation, we conclude that workers almost stopped climbing
the job ladder during the GR, and the recovery was almost absent.
Looking more closely at the calibrated sampling distribution (Figure 14), we first see that
the empirical distribution of job openings, F JOLTS (·), vastly underestimates our calibrated
Ft (·) for all rank classes, but more severely so at the lower end of the job ladder. This is
(qualitatively) consistent with the findings of Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2010), who
report that 41.6 percent of all hires occur at establishments with zero posted job opening in
the micro data underlying JOLTS, with that proportion ranging from 76.9 percent for the
small JOLTS size class down to roughly 7 percent for our largest size class. Second, there is
a very slight upward time trend in the sampling distribution at all cutoff points Xk.
23 This
is consistent with the empirical observation that the average size of US establishments has
declined over recent decades, while that of the average firm has increased, so misclassification
in the sense that affects our data has arguably become worse.
Finally, Figure 15 shows the model counterpart of what we called average vacancy weights
in our description of the data (Section 2), i.e. the sampling probabilities divided by the
number of employers in each class,24 normalized to one in January 2001 to harmonize scales.25
This is a measure of hiring effort by each employer per size class, relative to the aggregate
hiring effort. We can clearly see that, as the financial crisis unfolded, hiring effort by each
employer rose in relative terms at the bottom of the size of the distribution, and fell at the
top. This is a symptom of a failing job ladder by employer size. Comparing Figure 15 to
its empirical counterpart based on JOLTS vacancies (Fig. 9), we see that our estimated
sampling weights at the top of the size distribution are estimated to differ from the JOLTS
vacancy weights. In this sense, the model provides an important filter to the data.
5.3 Discussion
We now take stock of our results. Figure 15 indicates that the vacancy weights and sampling
probabilities of high-rank employers increased during both the 2001 recession and the begin-
ning of the 2008 recession, while those of low-rank employers stayed flat or even declined.
This fact in itself is striking in the light of MPV12’s finding that recessions are times when
23A linear time trend is found positive and statistically significant for all k in both Ft+1 (Xk) and
F JOLTSt+1 (Xk).
24Consistently with our procedure to correct for misclassification, we use the number of establishments in
each size class in CEW, corrected for misclassification using the conversion matrix M, as our measure of the
number of employers in each size class.
25The non-rescaled series, available on request, are nicely increasing with productivity class. This tallies
with the prediction of the job ladder model, according to which more productive employers post more
vacancies (see MPV13).
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small (or low-rank) employers are growing relative to large ones. It also suggests that the
vacancy yield of small employers must have increased by much more than that of large ones
during those recessions, a hypothesis that finds some support in the raw data (Figure 10).
Perhaps even more striking is the sudden reversal of this pattern at the end of 2008, imme-
diately after the Lehman Brothers episode: at that point, the sampling probability of the
high-rank class collapses, while that of the lowest-rank class soars, in relative terms. This,
combined with a very low baseline job finding rate λt (Figure 12) suggests that at that point
high-rank firms froze their demand for new labor, and that what little hiring took place did
so at the lower-rank end of the population of employers. This in indeed what we observe
when examining JOLTS hire rates by employer size after reclassifications. Even more than
in the raw data (Figure 2), hire rates rise sharply and temporarily at the lower end of the
size distribution, while upgrading to better jobs slow down considerably, as evidenced by the
durably low EE quit rates that ensued (Figure 13). In short, the job ladder failed, starting
from the upper rungs.
Reclassification does not change, and if anything reinforces, the qualitative time series
pattern of layoffs by establishment size that we found in the raw data (Figure 3). Layoffs
significantly contributed to the increase in unemployment during the GR, but the persistence
of high unemployment in the four years after the end of the GR is entirely accounted for by the
failure of job finding rates to recover and the persistent increase in unemployment duration.
After reclassifying establishments into rank classes so as to fit the job ladder model, the
spike in layoff rates is much sharper among low-rank employers. The contemporaneous shift
in sampling weights towards the bottom of the size distribution that we documented earlier
suggests that the employers that were least affected by the GR, especially after September
2008, took advantage of rising unemployment to hire; because in the job ladder model each
low-rank employer is more dependent on the reservoir of unemployed, it responded more,
i.e. cut its vacancies by less. In addition, recall that the job ladder has a hard time fitting
the raw data at the very low end of the size distribution, as quit rates from very small
establishments are low relative to those in the two subsequent size classes. This observation
suggests very significant heterogeneity among small establishments. Some are small because
unproductive. Others are temporarily small but very productive and attractive because still
growing. Indeed, Fort, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2012) draw a sharp distinction
between the cyclical dynamics of net employment growth at young and old small firms in
Census data, that break down net employment flows by age and size, but lacks information
on gross workers flows. So it appears that the small class as a whole shed much more
employment by actively laying workers off, but also hired more by taking advantage of high
unemployment and the dynamism of young employers.
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To summarize: during the GR all employers temporarily raised their layoff rates, expe-
rienced slower attrition, and reduced their vacancy postings and hire rates; small employers
laid off more and simultaneously reduced less their hiring effort, even hired more, but also
experienced more of the decline in job-to-job quits, because hiring effort and hires at the top
almost vanished; the job ladder slowed down at the bottom and almost stopped at the top.
We can briefly speculate on the reasons behind these events. One distinguishing feature
of the GR, relative to previous recessions, was the credit crunch in late 2008 and early
2009, which may have impacted especially small employers. Our evidence is consistent
with a credit crunch that affected more existing businesses, particularly the older and less
productive ones, than new entrants and young growing but still small businesses. After
the financial crisis exploded in Fall 2008, businesses, especially small ones, had a hard time
finding and revolving working capital to pay their workers, so they had to actively reduce
their workforce through layoffs, in part because attrition through quits to other employers
and nonemployment collapsed. The contemporaneous reduction in vacancy postings that
affected disproportionately large employers does not support more traditional theories of
credit constraints, where firms, especially small ones, have a hard time securing new financing
to invest and create new jobs.
6 Conclusions
We study labor reallocation, both through unemployment and directly from job to job,
across employers of different productivities. We focus on the US economy around the Great
Recession. In order to impose structure on our empirical investigation, we formulate a
dynamic job-ladder model, where employers that are ranked more highly by workers, for
example because higher-paying, spend more hiring effort and, conditional on contacting
another worker, are more likely to succeed in hiring. As a consequence, an employer’s size
is a relevant proxy for rank. We use newly available monthly time series from JOLTS on
employment net and gross flows by size of the establishment. We find that our parsimonious
turnover model of a dynamic job ladder fits the facts quite well, and implies “true” vacancy
postings by size that are more in line with gross flows and intuition than JOLTS’ measures
of vacancies, previously criticized by other authors. Our main finding is that the job ladder
stopped working in the GR and never fully resumed. Job-to-job quits, especially from the
bottom of the size/rank distribution, collapsed, further reducing the incentives of small
employers to post vacancies and to hire unemployed workers to offset attrition.
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A Additional descriptive evidence
A.1 The wage-size job ladder
It has been long documented that employer size correlates positively with wage rates, after
controlling for observable worker characteristics (Brown and Medoff, 1989). In this paper
we focus on employer-level data and take the extreme view that workforce quality is homo-
geneous across employer sizes, so that any wage differential related to size can be thought
of as a wage premium. This is in the spirit of the model we presented earlier. If wage/size
differentials reflected entirely different types of workers at employers of different sizes, we
would still have to explain why workers sort by the size of their employer.
For establishments, we draw information from QCEW. Information is also published at
annual frequency (covering the first quarter of the year) by establishment size, in one of ten
size classes, with lower bounds 1, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 250, 500, and 1,000 employees.26 From
this we draw the distribution of establishment counts, employment and weekly earnings per
worker, all averaged over the first quarter of the year, by establishment size, for each year
from 1990 to 2012 included, for the U.S. and all industries combined.27
Table 2 reports the results of an establishment-level OLS regression of earnings per worker
on size and other establishment characteristics. The dependent variable is a measure of
real weekly earnings, the ratio between CPI-deflated total quarterly payroll and average
employment among all establishments in the “cell”, for each year from 1990 to 2012 included.
The cell depends on the specification, and is indicated by which dummies we include among
the covariates. So the dependent variable varies across specifications, which are not directly
comparable. Size dummies and year dummies are always included. In specification II, each
cell includes all establishments in the same size class and 2-digit NAICS industry. In III,
each cell includes all establishments in the same size class, 2-digit NAICS industry, and
located in the same US state. And so on. Information on geographic location is available
only at the 2-digit industry level, due to potential disclosure risk. The regression is weighted
by the number of establishments per cell. The results clearly indicate a wage ladder, except
at the very bottom when not controlling for industry and location. Because average weekly
earnings in the omitted (smallest) size class are about $330, top-to-bottom pay differentials
between largest and smallest establishments are in the order of 80% in specification I, and
26http:// www.bls.gov/cew/cewsize.htm accessed 2/23/2013.
27For earnings at the national level, all industries, we find two outliers, possibly the result of some coding
error in collating the semi-aggregated data, in size class “10-19 employees” in year 1999 and in size class
“1,000 employees and up” in 1995. We replace those two values of earnings with the average of the entries
in adjacent years for the same size class. Although this averaging introduces measurement error, the year-
over-year changes implied by the BLS original entries differ from all the rest of the sample by two orders of
magnitude.
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Establishment size class I II III IV V
1 to 4 (omitted)
5 to 9 −27.62
(0.001)
−17.01
(0.01)
5.59
(0.02)
−24.83
(0.008)
5.93
(0.02)
10 to 19 −13.62
(0.001)
−4.02
(0.01)
27.04
(0.03)
−8.04
(0.01)
34.82
(0.02)
20 to 49 3.80
(0.002)
23.45
(0.01)
50.05
(0.03)
5.70
(0.01)
52.37
(0.03)
50 to 99 28.61
(0.003)
38.38
(0.02)
64.23
(0.05)
29.81
(0.02)
68.96
(0.05)
100 to 249 55.22
(0.004)
48.12
(0.03)
73.24
(0.07)
55.15
(0.02)
81.47
(0.06)
250 to 499 101.94
(0.009)
76.23
(0.06)
88.30
(0.15)
102.19
(0.05)
82.21
(0.13)
500 to 999 158.14
(0.014)
112.73
(0.10)
95.43
(0.27)
156.93
(0.08)
70.93
(0.22)
1000 and up 272.12
(0.02)
226.22
(0.14)
174.40
0.38
263.51
(0.12)
131.98
(0.31)
industry dummies N 2-digit 2-digit N 5-digit
state dummies N N Y Y N
R2 0.94 0.87 0.56 0.60 0.78
Source: QCEW and authors’ calculations. Dependent variable: average weekly
earnings per worker in each establishment (1983$). Standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include year dummies.
Table 2: The wage-size premium.
lower when controlling for industry and location. Employer-level TFP in our model may be
in part a result of the industry in which the employer operates, so controlling for industry
composition may not be appropriate.
For firms, the Statistics of US Businesses (SUSB) program at the Bureau of the Census
publishes annual data on total employment, payroll and (every five years) receipts by firm
size, disaggregated in 17-20 size categories, from 1992 to 2010, 2004 excluded (the size
classification is coarser in 1992-1993). The Census defines a firm by grouping establishments
by legal form and control structure. Figure 16 reports evidence from the SUSB on wage/size
premia at the firm level. We take total annual payroll per worker for each size class, divide
by that of the smallest class 1-4 employees, and subtract one. We omit the size class ‘0’
employees, which includes entrants, because it reports payroll but not employment. The
results speak for themselves. The wage differential between the largest and smallest firms
is less than 50%, significantly smaller than or establishments, also taking into account that
the largest firm size class starts at the higher 1,500 employees cutoff. As we will discuss
later in more detail, this may be due to the fact that large firms that only comprise large
establishments may be the highest-paying of all. So, when combining them with equally
large multi-establishment firms, their average pay premium declines.
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Fig. 16: Wage differential with respect to firms of size 1-4 employees.
A.2 Employment and establishment shares by size class
Figure 17 illustrates that employment shares by size of the establishment in QCEW are
relatively stable over time, but do exhibit the cyclical pattern documented by MPV12 for
firms; namely, the share of larger employers declines in the three recessions in the sample
period. The GR is no exception.28
Our empirical exercise is based on the assumptions that the distribution of employers
by rank in worker preferences is time-invariant and coincides with their distribution by size.
One implication of this assumption is that the distribution of establishment counts by size
classes should be relatively stable at business cycle frequencies. This is true in JOLTS size
data by construction of the dataset, so the identity of the establishments is fixed, at least
within each sampling year typically March to February. Across years, Figure 18 illustrates
28We can draw the same information on employment shares by firm size, at a finer degree of size classifi-
cation, from two BLS datasets, where a firm is identified by a federal tax Employer Identification Number
(EIN). First, the Business Employment Dynamics (BED) program collects information on job flows and
stocks, from the same QCEW universe, at quarterly frequency starting in 1992, and presents them by size of
the parent company. Second, the Current Employment Statistics (CES) program is the well-known monthly
“pay-roll survey” of about 145,000 businesses and government agencies from the QCEW frame, representing
approximately 557,000 individual work sites. The survey provides timely and detailed industry data on
employment, hours, and earnings of workers on nonfarm payrolls. In both datasets, once again, the share of
employment at small firms is countercyclical. In the GR, it rose especially in the second, deeper half of the
downturn. Results are available upon request.
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Fig. 17: Employment shares by establishment size class.
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Employment shares of establishments by size class.
Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: CEW.
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Fig. 18: Shares of establishments by establishment size class.
40
these shares in QCEW, which is the frame from which JOLTS is drawn. Shares are in log
scale to make them visible, because the distribution of establishment counts is much more
compressed at the low end. We can see a very modest trend and cyclical component. By
and large, the distribution of establishment counts is stable, much more so than that of
employment.
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